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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

SITATE OF UTAH

HOGAN DAIRY COMPANY,
a corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

-vs.-

Case No. 9241

CREAl\{[ERY PACKAGE MANUFACTURING COl\rfPANY, a corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff, Hogan Dairy, hereinafter referred to as
I-IOGAN, is a Utah corporation, doing a dairy business
in the Salt Lake Valley. Defendant, Creamery Package
Manufacturing Company, hereinafter referred to as
CREAMERY PACKAGE, is an Illinois corporation
which manufactures and sells Milk Processing Equipment
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including equipment known as Vac Heat and Ultra High
Te1nperature Equipment, hereinafter referred to as
VAC HEAT.
During the month of April 1958, Blaine Anderson, a
salesman for ·Creamery Package, approached Hogan to
sell it a Vac Heat unit. Anderson told Hogan what the
machine would do in the p-rocessing of milk and gave
Ifogan literature put out by Creamery Package describing what the machine would do. (Ex. 2P) The representations by Creamery Package were two-fold; first,
unappetizing flavors and odors would be eliminated from
milk and the milk would thereby acquire a uniformally
good flavor and odor; second, the milk processed "\vould
acquire a longer "shelf life" which, in the industry, is
understood to mean keeping quality. (Tr. 8, 15) These
were to be accomplished by subjecting the milk to ultra
high temperatures, thereby getting a greater kill of bacteria normally present in milk and consequently increasing the shelf life because of less action of bacteria, and
by putting the milk in a vacuum and drawing off the
volatile portions which contain unwanted flavors and
odors.
Hogan evidenced an interest in the machine and a
desire to acquire it but was "\Yorried about being able
to finance the transaction. Hogan asked if it could be
acquired on a rental, instead of a purchase, basis inasmuch as Hogan did not have the $6,300.00 cash needed to
purchase it and 'vould obtain a tax advantage by renting
instead of purrhasing on tin1e. (Tr. 17, 65, 320) Cream-
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3
ery Package had no rental set-up but said that it could
arrange to accomplish this by having an equipment rental
company, in the general business of renting all types of
equipment, acquire the machine and simultaneously lease
it to Hogan. National Equipment Ltd., hereinafter referred to as NATIONAl-A a New York corporation, was
selected as the financing company.
It was agreed bet,veen IIogan and Creamery Package, in lieu of Hogan's buying from Creamery Package,
Creamery Package would sell the Vac Heat to National
and National would lease it to Hogan, but that delivery
would be made directly from Creamery Package to
Hogan and Creamery Package would plan and supervise
the pToper installation and initial operation thereof.
(Tr.17-19, 23, 2·4, 302, 328, 346)
Upon reaching an agreement that IIogan would get
the machine, Hogan undertook a greatly expanded advertising program plugging the merits of milk processed
by \Tac Heat, advertising that it V\'ould have better keeping qualities and a "Hi-Fi" flavor. (Tr. 26, 180, 198)
Cartons for Hogan milk were ordered which advertised
the ne"\V process. (Tr. 85, 87, 101) In August of 1958,
Creamery Package sold the Vac Heat to National and
National leased it to Hogan, and it was delivered directly
from Creamery Package to Hogan. (Tr. 27, 326) Creamery Package personnel drew plans and flow sheets and
designs diagramming the installation, and supervised the
installation of the Vac Heat, in accordance with the
agreement. (Tr. 26-28, 328)
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From the time the machine was first installed troubles developed. (Tr. 29, 30) The milk so processed had
an unappetizing flavor, a scorched taste and offensive
odor. (Tr. 31, 103, 106-122, 135-139, 151) In addition to
the problems of flavor and odor, the milk so processed
had a very short shelf life and putrefied rapidly. ( Tr.
106-122, 172)
These difficulties were at once apparent to Hogan,
(Tr. 29, 31) not only from their o\vn observations and
tests but also because of the complaints of customers
which at once skyrocketed. (Tr. 102, 141)
Hogan immediately and continuously complained to
the Creamery Package men of the results obtained. Numerous changes in the installation were made by Creamery Package such as re-positioning valves, changing
pipes, etc., to reduce the tune the milk was exposed to
ultra high temperatures. (Tr. 36, 289, 291, 292) On each
occasion that a complaint was made by Hogan, Creamery
Package men assured Hogan either that the difficulties
were not caused by the Vac Heat unit or that the problems had been or would be ren1edied. (Tr. 46, 47, 1±±, 145,
147' 170, 192, 289, 291, 298, 299, 306, 309, 310, 333, 342,
343, 344, 397)
In November of 1958 an air leak in the machine was
found. Hogan and Creamery Package had suspected a
leak because excessive foam had al\Yays been encountered
but it "'"as not found until four months after installation.
The leak was in a \veld in the \..-ac Heat unit. (Tr. 38)
The mechanical operation of the machine improved sub-
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stantially after this air leak "\\"as plugged. After the plugging of the air leak, the modifications in installation, and
the advent of cold weather, the problems ceased. They
started to re-occur the next summer and when Hogan
started again to get complaints from customers, it disconnected the machine and did not subsequently use it
and the problems ceased. (Tr. 45)
The rental contract between National and Hogan
made Hogan liable for rentals regardless of the quality
or nature of the operation of the machine by an express
disclaimer of any warranty on the part of National. (Ex.
4D) Hogan paid rentals and still has the machine for
which it has no use. (Tr. 46)
It would be an understatement to say that l-Iogan
customers were dissatisfied with the milk processed by
Vac Heat between August and November. The advertising campaign was getting new customers but the number
of new ones could not keep pace with the number of old
customers quitting. Not only did many retail customers
quit, but also wholesale outlets were lost, the most important of which were the Albertson stores, which had
just been acquired. (Tr. 177)
Explanations given by some of the experts for the
problems encountered were as follows:
A cooked flavor or a scorched taste was imparted
to the milk by the ultra high heat. In addition to the
scorched taste, in many instances, there was a putrid
flavor which could be attributed to the fact that the ultra
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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high heat, in killing off most of the bacteria, killed those
bacteria which normally create acid which sours milk.
In doing so, other putrefying bacteria, which in their
spore form can resist high temperatures and which
normally are inhibited by acid formed by other types
of bacteria were left free to develop. The heat resistant
spores freely and uninhibitedly developed and the milk
thereby became putrid instead of souring. (Tr. 130) It
did so at a greatly increased rate so that the shelf life
instead of being lengthened was shortened and a rotten
odor rapidly developed in milk so processed if it was not
ideally refrigerated by the user. (Tr. 105-121, 135-137)
Some of Creamery Package experts attributed the
bad flavor and poor shelf life to factors other than the
use of the Vac Heat unit because Vac Heat had been
used by dairies in other sections of the country successfully. But bacteria present in raw milk, both in their
spore form and otherwise, vary from area to area (Tr.
261, 385) so that a process might be successful in one
area and not in another. The only units vrhich had been
tried in Utah were both unsuccessful and were removed
because of probler1s \vith rapid putrefaction a:ad bad
odors. ( Tr. 129, 132, 215) Hogan's practices in operation
of the dairy did not change during the period involved
except in the use of the \.,. ac Heat machine and no such
problems had arisen before nor did they arise after the
removal of the unit. (Tr. 411)
Hogan attributed the following damage to the \Tac
Heat Unit:
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Cost of replacement milk, (Tr. 48, 178)
Loss of employees, (Tr. 152, 174)
Loss of customers, ( Tr. 157, 160, 171, 226)
Loss of value of advertising, (Tr. 189)
Loss of value of promotional expenditures, (Tr.

190)
Loss of income, ( Tr. 218)
Loss of good will, (Tr. 183)
The Vac Heat unit could easily have been completely
by-passed and eliminated from the treatment process by
changing pipe connections, which would have taken about
20 minutes, (Tr. 295). The ultra high heat could have
been eliminated by turning off the steam injection valve
which would have taken a few seconds. Either would
have eliminated the problems caused by the unit. (Tr.
365) Hogan did not do either although it knew that
(a) The flovv of milk through the unit was too slow
and fluctuated excessively. ( Tr. 29, 31)
(b) Excessive foam occurred in the unit. (Tr. 31,
411)
(c) The milk had a cooked flavor which did not
dissipate as it should have done. (Tr. 31, 313)
(d) The milk had a poor shelf life. (Tr. 151)
(e)

Some 1nilk putrefied. (Tr.138)

(f) There was no cavitation (rattling sound) which
is necessary for efficient operation. (Tr. 410)
(g) Complaints of customers tremendously increased. (Tr. 141)
(h)

Customers quit. (Tr. 169)
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POIN·T I.
INSTRUCTION NO. 13 IS ERRONEOUS.
POINT II.
FAILING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 1 WAS ERROR.
POINT III.
FAILING TO GIVE PLAINlTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 3 WAS ERROR.
POINT IV.
FAILING TO GIVE PLAIN·TIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 5 WAS ERROR.
POINT V.
ADMISSION OF EXHIBITS 11D AND 12D WAS ERROR.
).
POINT VI.
THE EVIDEN·CE IS INSUFFICIEN:T TO JUSTIFY THE
VERDICT AND THE VERDICT IS AGAINST LAW.
POINT VII.
THE CO·URT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW 'TRIAL.

ARGUl\IENT
POINT I.
INSTRUCTION NO. 13 IS ERRONEOUS.

The instruction is as follows :
"You are instructed that if plaintiff continued
to operate the 1narhinery in question after it discovered, or should have discovered, that the nlachinery was not operating properly and that such
defect in the Var-Heat n1arhinery 'Yas causing the
contamination of plaintiff's milk product, then
it was the duty of the plaintiff to desist and re-
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frain from using said machinery and that if plaintiff did continue to use said machinery after discovering defects therein, or improper functioning
of the same, then you are instructed that the
plaintiff cannot recover for any da1nages resulting from continued use after plaintiff had lmowledge, or in the exercise of reasonable care should
have .had knowledge of the defective op·eration of
the Vac-Heat machinery and that such defect in
the Vac-Heat machinery was causing the contamination of plaintiff's milk product."
The reason the use of the unit was not discontinued
was that Creamery Package men "\vere the experts supervising the installation and initial operation and they
assured Hogan each time a complaint was made, that the
problems were not caused by Vac-Heat, or the problems
would be remedied, or the problems had been remedied
by changes made. Hogan had had no experience with
the unit and relied on the experience and ability of
Creamery Package to get it operating properly as it had
been agreed Creamery Package should do, and as its
experts said it would and could do. Hogan's entire sales
promotion was based upon its successful operation. Yet
the court gave instruction No. 13 which prohibited any
recovery if Hogan knew- or should have known of defective operation of the Vac-Heat unit. That was the equivalent of giving a directed verdict in favor of Creamery
Package because the evidence was uncontradicted that
Hogan knew of flavor and mechanical problems from the
time of installation and also knew of the shelf life or
putrefaction problems from the time they arose. Hogan
always attributed these problems to the Vac-Heat unit.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The correct rule qualifies the obligation to stop
using the unit by relating it to what a reasonable man
under the circumstances would have done.
The case of Beagley v. United States Gypsum Company, 120 U. 487, 235 P. 2d 783, 789, states the rule as being that plaintiff must do "all a reasonable person would
have done under like circumstances in order to minimize
his loss."
The rule is generally stated in 15 Am. J~tr., Damages,
Par. 28, as follo,vs:
"The measure of his duty is such care and
diligence as a man of ordinary prudence would
use under the circumstances, and the efforts required of him must be determined by the rules
of common sense, good faith, and fair dealing.
What constitutes reasonable care depends upon
the circumstances of the particular case, taking
into consideration time, knowledge, opportunity,
and expense.''
In applying this generalized statement, it is further
stated as follows :
"An injured person may recover to the full
extent of his injury where he shows reasonable
grounds for his failure to make an effort to lesson
his damages. Thus, the repeated assurance of the
defendant after an injury has begun that he will
remedy the condition is sufficient justification for
the plaintiff's failure to take steps to minimize
loss, so long, at least, as there is ground for expecting that he will perform."
Norfolk & liV. R. Co. v. A1nicon Fr,uit Co., ( C.C.A.
4th) 269 F. 559, 14 A.L.R. 547.
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An annotation in 81 A.L.I!. 282 on "Duty to ~liti
gate Dan1ages" discusses various cases, some of which
discussion is quoted.
"The obligation to minimize damages never
requires a party to exercise more than reasonable
care to that end (Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Sandlin
(1925) 209 Ky. 442, 272 S.W. 912)
"The rule is simply one of good faith and
fair dealing. Gilbert v. Kennedy (1871) 22 Mich.
117. It does not require one to do his utmost to
minimize damages, without regard to his own
interests, but only what is reasonable under the
circumstances. Bridgeport v. Aetna Indem. ·Co.,
(1919) 93 Conn. 277, 105 Atl. 680."
The case of Lopeman v. Gee, 40 vVash. 2d 586, 245
P. 2d 183, deals with a similar problen1. Headnote 7,
is as follows:
"Where owners of stored onions complained
to agents of warehouseman that onions were
sweating and becoming damp and mouldy and,
upon each occasion, were assured that the storage
conditions complained of would be remedied, owners were entitled to rely upon these assurances
and did not have duty to mitigate damages by
taking onions out of storage as soon as they learned of threatened loss."
The Court said:
"Appellant urges it was respondents' duty to
mitigate damages by taking the onions out of storage as soon as they learned of the threatened loss.
It is true, one is ordinarily required to make reaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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sonable efforts to avoid the consequence of another's wrongful act by avoiding any consequences
resulting therefrom. However, if, after an injury
is begun, there are repeated assurances from the
wrongdoer that the condition complained of will
be rem~died, there is no duty upon the part of
the injured party to take steps to minimize the
loss so long as there are grounds to expect that he
'vill perform. Florence Fish Co. v. Everett Packing Co., 111 Wash. 1, 188 P. 792; McCormick, Damages, 140, Sec. 38; Annotation, 81 A.L.R. 282 at
page 284.
"The trial court found that 'plaintiffs complained to agents of defendant in charge of said
storage and upon each occasion were assured that
the storage condition complained of would be
remedied.' Plaintiffs, under the circumstances of
this case, were entitled to rely upon these assurances."
See also Sears Roebuck v. Grant, ______ Wash. ______ ,
298 P. 2d 497.
The repeated assurances of the defendant after an
injury has begun, that he will remedy the condition,
is sufficient justification for the plaintiff's failure to
take steps to minimize loss, so long, at least, as there
is ground for expecting that he will perform. Kentucky
DistiJlleriJes & W arehou,se Co. v. Lillard (1908) 87 C.
C.A. 190, 160 F. 34; Illinois C.R.C. v. Doss (1910) 137
Ky. 658, 126 S.W. 349.
Furthermore, the duty to mitigate damages does
not relate to the performance of the primary obligations
of the contract. So, 'vhere one "'"hose duty it is to do work
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necessary to fulfill a contract had equal knowledge of the
consequences of noncompliance and opportunity to fulfill
the obligation, he alone may be depended on to perform
the duty, and it will not avail him to say the injured party
might have lessened the damages. Louisville, N.A. & C.R.
Co. v. Sttmner (1886) 106 Ind. 55, 55 Am. Rep. 719, 5 NE
404. Therefore, since the primary obligation of the
agreement was that Creame·ry Package would install the
machine and get it functioning properly, Creamery Package could not defend on the ground that Hogan is barred
because it knew the unit was operating improperly.
The trial court in its memorandum decision denying a motion for a new trial tacitly admitted that instruction No. 13 is erroneous by stating "Although the Instruction No. 13 might have been modified to meet the criticisms of the cases cited by counsel for plaintiff, it
seemed to fit the circumstances and requirements of our
lawsuit and is thought not to be prejudicial in any event"
because of Instruction No. 16. But Instruction No. 16
was merely an instruction that damages must be the
natural and probable result of the breach of contract.
Instruction 16 reads as follows:
"INSTRUCTION NO. 16
"If you resolve in favor of the plaintiff the
issue as to whether or not there was a contract
between the parties, as required by the foregoing
instruction, you are instructed that the damages
which plaintiff is entitled to recover in resp·ect
to such breach of contract are those as may fairly
and reasonably be considered, either arising
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naturally and probably, that is, according to the
natural course of things, from such breach, and
as such as may reasonably be supposed to have
been in contemplation of the parties at the time
they made the contract, as the probable result of
its breach.
"Recoverable elements of damage may include, among other elements, injury to business
reputation, loss of business standing, loss of customers or business, loss of employees. The profits
which would have been realized had the contract
been performed, and which have been prevented
by its breach, are included in the damages which
may be recovered if they are the natural and
proximate result of the breach complained of and
are capable of ascertainment with reasonable certainty.''
Reading 16 and 13 together the plain meaning is that 13
restricts 16 so that those damages which are the natural
and probable result of the breach of contract are recoverable only if Hogan did not and should not have kno"Tn
that Vac-Heat was causing the trouble. How can an instruction which bars recovery be non-prejudicial~
The trial court further stated in its memorandum
decision that "Instruction 13 was directed to and related
only to what might be called subsequent damages-The
conclusion seems justified, therefore, that the jury found
that there was no contract." Such reasoning would be
true only if there were an initial period during which
Hogan did not blame Vac He-at for the problems encountered. The evidence is clear that Hogan knew of
improper functioning beginning with the very first oper-
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ation in August and continuing into November. (Tr. 2932, 46, 144, 145, 192, 289, 291, 299, 307, 313, 332) Under
instruction 13 Hogan had a duty to immediately stop using the unit and therefore the jury could not find in its
favor.
POINT II.
FAILING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 1 WAS ERROR.

The requested instruction was a.s follows:
"INSTRUCTIOl~

NO. 1

''You are instrureted that the evidence is uncontradicted, that plaintiff .and defendant agreed
a.s follows :
"Defendant agreed to sell to N a.tional Equipment Rental Limited a Vac Heat Unit. Plaintiff
agreed to lease s.aid V ac Heat Unit from the
Rental Co1npany. Defendant did sell to the Rental
Company and plaintiff did lease from the Rental
Company said unit. Defendant further agreed
th.a t for and in consideration of plaintiff agreeing
to lease said unit from the Leasing Comp,any defendant would ship said unit directly to plaintiff,
defendant would sup·ervise the installation of said
unit according to plans and specifications furnished by defendant, defendant would furnish the
technical personnel necessary to install said unit
in proper operating condition, defendant would
furnish qualified personnel to instruct plaintiff
in the prop-er operation of said unit. The evidence
is further undisputed that defendant represented
and agreed with plaintiff that if plaintiff acquired
said unit and used it in the processing of its milk
that said unit would improve the flavor of milk
so processed and vvould improve the keeping qualSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ities or shelf life of said milk. You are therefore
instructed that there is no issue as to whether or
not there was an agreement between the parties
and you are instructed that there was an agreement as above de-scribed.''
The evidence of th-e facts set forth in the request
1s uncontradicted. The testimony of Max Hogan (Tr.
6-24) established the agreement. ·This testimony was
not only not eontradicted but was corroborated by the
testimony of Blaine Anderson who made the agreement
on behalf of Creamery Package and who certainly would
have corrected any misstatement by Max Hogan. It was
therefore the duty of the court to instruct that there
was a contract and submit to the jury only the question
of breach and damage rather than to let the _jury speculate on the existenee or non-existence of an agreement.
Moore, in discussing the Federal practice, which
Utah should follow, says:
''Where no evidence is adduced to disprove
the prima facie ease of the plaintiff and his evidence stands uncontradicted and unimpeached, the
court should direct." 5 III oore' s Federal Practice,
2314, Note 7.
In Cannan v. Curkeet, 86 F. 2d 573, the court said:
"It is elementary that, in Federal courts,
where undisputed evidence den1ands a verdict in
favor of one of t·he parties, it is the duty of the
judge to direct it. ''
In Brandon v. Holman, 41 F. 2d 586, a bank cashier,
according to the undisputed testimony, improperly paid
out .money for his own gain. In affirming a verdict for
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the plain tiff the court said :
'' The verdict should be directed when the
evidence . . . with all inferences that the jury
could draw from it, leads to but one conclusion.''
In Colthurst v. Lake View State Bank, 18 F. 2d 875,
in a suit on a note, where the only evidence was to the
effect that plaintiff was a holder in due course without
notiee, a directed verdict for the plaintiff was affirmed.
The court said that defendant does not have the right
"to have a jury pass upon his claim'' nor does "credibility of an uncontradicted and unimpeached witness in
all cases" present a jury question.
In Campagnie Generale Transatlant~que v. Amer~
can Tobacco Co., 31 F. 2d '663, in affirming a directed
verdict for the plaintiff, the court said:
"When the plaintiff in error failed to make
answer to the prima f.acie evidence offered . . .
it was the duty of the court below to direct the
verdict.''
In F~rst National Bank & Trust Company of Muskogee v. Heilman, 62 F. 2d 157, in a suit on a note, where
the only evidence was to the effect that plaintiff was
a holder in due course without notice, a directed verdict
for the plaintiff was denied by the lower court. This was
reversed. ·The court said :
''There are two classes of cases in which the
trial court should direct a verdict at the close of
the evidence (1) cases in which the evidence is
undisputed and (2) cases in whieh the evidence is
conflicting but is of so conclusive a character
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that the court in the exercise of a sound judicial
discretion ought to set aside a verdict in opposition thereto .... The rule applies notwithstanding the party introducing the evidence has the
burden of proof. . . . The instant case clearly
falls within the first class and the trial court
erred in not directing a verdict in favor of the
bank.''
53 Am. Jur. ·Trials.

"359. Undisputed Facts Supporting One
Conclusion. - The presence or absence of conflicting testimony in a case is a consideration by
which the courts are governed in directing verdicts. Where the material issues or controlling
facts are conceded, or the proof offered to establish them is undisputed, uncontradicted, or uncontroverted, or such facts are conclusively established or established beyond dispute, or the evidence is all one way, and is unconflicting and
uncont.radictory, and only one legitimate inference may he drawn, and there are no circumstances which tend to impair or impe.ach it, and
it is not 8Usceptible of inherent weaknesses, improbabilities, and incongruities which in and of
themselves naturally arise to contradict or impeach the weight and credibility of the utterances
of the witnesses, the only question being one of
law, the court may, should, and must, direct a
verdict.''
"361. Uncontradicted Oral Testimony.-While
it is the province of the jury to determine not
only the weight and sufficiency of the evidence,
but the credibility of the witnesses who testify,
this rule is not to be taken· as necessarily requiring the trial eourt to overrule a motion for a
directed verdict and sub1nit a case to the jury
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in order to permit the jury to pass upon the credibility of .a witness whose testimony is unimpeached and uncontradi,cted, and reasonably susceptible
to but one conclusion. - the more generally approved rule is that it is not only permissible, but
proper, for a trial court to direct, upon uniinpeaehed oral testimony given in behalf. of the
party having the burden of proof, where such testimony is direct, positive, and unequivocal, is not
contradicted either directly or indirectly, and is
not suseeptible of inherent weakness, improbability, or incredibility. This principle underlies the
great majority of the cases cited in the preceding
sections whieh recognize it to be not only within
the povver, but the duty, of the court to direct
verdicts when undisputed facts support only one
conclusion, or where a contrary verdict would
have no sup·port in the evidence.''
'' 386. When Verdict M.ay Be Directed. Again, the plaintiff is entitled to a direction in
his favor where the right to reeover is overwhelmingly shown, where the plaintiff's evidence is
sufficient to \Varrant a verdict in his favor and
no evidence has been adduced by the defendant
appreciably tending to overthrow the case made
by the plaintiff.''
"Where there is no evidence, direct or circumstantial, tending to impeach the witness upon
whose testimony an issue is based, the court
should give mandatory instruction." Cvti.zens
Trust & Sav. Bank v. Stackhouse, 91 SC 455, 74
SE 977, 40 LRA (NS) 454.
"Where the plaintiff's evidence makes a
prima facie case, and the defendant offers no
evidence, the court should, on motion, direct a
verdict for the plaintiff." Mason v. Sault, 93 Vt.
412, 108 A. 267, 18 ALR 1426.
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"It is fundamental that where there is no
evidence upon a material part of the plaintiff's
claim, it is the court's duty to direct a verdict.
In deciding a motion for a directed verdict, the
court must consider the evidence in the light most
favorable to the party against whom the motion
is directed and must resolve every controverted
fact in his favor. Jackson v. Colston, 116 Utah
295, 209 P. 2·d 566. The inquiry, then, must be directed toward whether reasonable minds could disagree in this case on the evidence presented so as
to provide a question for the jury." Boskov~ch v.
Utah Canst. Co., 123 U. 387, 259 P 2d 885, 886.
"The credibility, sufficiency, and weight of
the evidence on a given subject are for the jury;
the question whether there is any evidence on the
subject is for the court. Where the testimony is
all one way, uncontradicted by any testimony
given in the case, either from a party's own \Yitnesses or the other side, either in direct or crossexamination, or by any facts or circumstances
in the case, and is not in itself in any way improbable or discredited, and but one legitimate
inference may be dra\vn from it, and a case is
thereby made for the plaintiff or the defendant,
the duty rests upon the court to direct a verdict."
Bo~tdeman v. Arnold (1918) 200 ~fich. 162, 166
NW 985, 8 ALR 789.
POINT III.
FAILING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 3 WAS ERROR.

Requested Instruction No. 3

\Yas

as follo\YS:

''INSTRUCTION NO. 3
''You are instructed that if you believe that
the unit, a.s designed by defendant, \vould not
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p-rocess milk properly and if you further believe
from a preponderance of the evidence that defendant had ,agreed with plaintiff that the machine would process milk properly, then defendant is liable to plaintiff for the natural and probable results of the breach of said agreement, if
any."
One of Hogan's theories upon which it might recover
under the evidence before the jury was that even if the
mechanical functioning of the machine were satisfactory,
that the design and plan of installation ·of the machine
was such that, as installed in the Hogan Dairy, the milk
proces.sed through it acquired a scorched or a burned
flavor and putrefied rapidly. By failing to give this
instruction, the court p-resented to the jury only the
question of whether or not the machine functioned properly. The court thereby eliminated the questions of
whether or not the machine was properly enginee-red and
whether or not the design and plan of installation were
proper. The testimony that many changes were made by
Creamery Package in the initial installation, including
subsequent repositioning of valves which cut the time of
exposure of milk to ultr.a high heat in half, (Tr. 40, 293,
307) was proper evidence upon which the jury might well
have found that the initial installation was improperly
designed and p·lanned resulting in scorching and related
p·roblems.
POINT IV.
FAILING TO GIVE PLAIN'TIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 5 WAS ERROR.
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The requested instruction was as follows.:
''If you find in favor 'Of Plaintiff and find
that milk process.ed by Vac Heat did not have a
longer shelf-life as represented by Defendant that
it would have, it is no defense on the part of
Defendant that bacteria or spores were already
in the milk as it came from the farmers if it
could reasonably he anticipated that, under usual
and ordinary circumstances in the area involved,
such sp·ores or bacteria would be present in such
milk.''
Defendant's witness, :Th{r. Hedrick, testified that in
his opinion flavor problems could have been caused by
bacteria which were in the raw milk. (Tr. 360-361)
George Donald, the manager of Cloverleaf Dairy, testified that in his opinion the rapid putrefaction of milk
was caused by killing only a part of the bacteria and
spores which were already in the raw milk, but killing
substantially all acid forming bacteria so that bacteria
which caused putrefaction had an unhibited gro\\ih.
(Tr. 130) R.equested Instruction No. 5 \Yas therefore
necessary in order to cover fully the factual situation
presented to the jury.
POINT V.
ADMISSION OF EXHIBITS llD AND 12D WAS ERROR.

These two exhibits were blank forms, one being an
order blank and the other being a form for a contract
of conditional sale. In both of then1 Crerunery Package
disclaimed liability for defective equipment. Hogan had
never seen either these or si1nilar documents. (Tr 351)
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Hogan had no kn·owledge of the disclaimer of liability
contained therein and yet the court allowed the introduction of both of these documents over strenuous objection that they were not material to the issue in the
case. ( Tr. 340). Counsel for defendant used these exhibits and the dis,claimers contained therein in his argument to the jury, arguing that the disclaimer of liability
contained therein exonerated defendant from liability.
Such an uncommunicated limitation and disclaimer of
liability should not have been presented to the jury.
Defendant should not be exonerated from responsibility
for its express representations as to what Vac Heat
would do by provisos in blank forms it takes out of its
office files of which plaintiff has no knowledge whatever.
POINT VI.
THE EVIDEN,CE IS INSUFFICIEN'T TO JUSTIFY THE
VERDICT AND THE VERDICT IS AGAINST LAW.

The evidence is uncontradicted th.at there w.as a
contract that defendant would install the unit and get it
operating properly. The evidence is also uncontradicted
that the unit did not operate properly and that Hogan
suffered damage. There is therefore no legal basis for
the verdict of no cause of action rendered by six of the
eight jurors.
POINT VII.
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.

The above points were raised by plaintiff on its
motion for new trial whi·ch the court, in the exercise of
sound discretion, should have granted.
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CONCLUSION
Prejudioial error was committed and the judgment
should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
STEPHEN·S, BRAYTON & LOWE,
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant.

1001 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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